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PERFORMABILITY EVALUATION OF
THE SIFT COMPUTER
by
J.F. Meyer, D.G. Furchtgott and L.T. Wu
systems Engineering Laboratory
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Abztnact - Performability modeling and evaluation techniques
are applied to the SIFT computer as it might operate in the com-
putational environment of an air transport mission. User-
visible performance of the "total system" (SIFT plus its environ-
ment) is modeled as a random variable taking values in a set of
"levels of accomplishment." These levels are defined n terms
of four attributes of total system behavior: safety, no change
in mission profile, no operational penalties, and no economic
penalties. The "base model" of the total system is a stochastic
process whose states describe the internal structure of SIFT as
well as relavant conditions of the environment. Base model
state trajectories are related to accomplishment levels via a
"capability function" which is formulated in terms of a 3-level
model hierarchy. Performability evaluation algorithms are
then applied to determine the performability of the total-system
for various choices of computer and environment parameter
values. Numerical results of those evaluations are presented
and, in conclusion, some implications of this effort are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Performability modeling and evaluation methods, as intro-
duced in [1], provide a means for quantifying "ability to
perform" when system performance is "degradable," that is,
depending on the history of the computer's structure and environ-
ment during some specified utilization period T, the system
can exhibit one of several worthwhile levels of performance
(as viewed by the user throughout T). Of particular interest
are systems where degraded levels of performance (in addition to
i
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"full degradation" or "failure") are caused, at least in part,
by changes in the computer's structure. Typically, such changes
are due to faults which occur during utilization and to subse-
quent structural reconfigurations that are made in the process
of fault recovery. Changes in structure may also be due to
reconfigurations that are made to accomodate changes in the
computer's environment and, particularly, its workload.
The growing interest in such systems is a consequence of the
fact that computing systems with distributed hardware and soft-
ware resources (e.g., multiprocessors, multicomputers, dis-
+ `_buted operating systems, distributed data bases, etc.) often
.hibit this type of degradable performance. In particular,
.iis is true of distributed, fault-tolerant computers that are
esigned to detect and locate a faulty resource and, through
_econfiguration, eliminate its use.
If performance is degradable then, as observed in [11,
traditional views of computer "performance" and computer "reli-
ability" are no longer applicable. These views matured in the
context of nondegradable performance where, in the presence of
structural changes, a system either performs adequately (success)
or does not (failure). In this context, "performance" is
regarded as successful performance and "reliability" as the
ability to perform successfully (probability of success).
Accordingly, performance can be evaluated relative to a fixed,
fault-free structure (since the system is presumed to perform
successfully when it is fault-free) and reliability can be
evaluated relative to a structure-based definition of success.
r	 ,
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In particular, we see these views reflected by the analytic
models that are typically used for computer performance and
reliability evaluation. Probabilistic models for performance
evaluation (see [2] - [4], for example) represent variations in
internal state (e.g., the number of jobs being served or waiting
for service in each resource) and workload (e.g., job arrivals)
but assume that the structure of the system is fixed (time-
invariant). On the other hand, probabilistic models for reli-
ability evaluation (beginning with [5] and continuing through
the recent work of [6] and [71) represent variations in structure
(e.g., for each type of resource, the number that remain fault-
free) while ignoring the influence of internal state and workload.
Although such modeling restrictions are appropriate in the case
of nondegradable systems, as argued in [1], more general models
are called for when performance is degradable.
As a consequence of these observations, a general modeling
framework was introduced [1] which permits the definition,
formulation, and evaluation of a unified performance-reliability
measure referred to as "performability." The purpose of this
paper is to describe the techniques of performability modeling
and evaluation in more detail via their application to a specific
computer and computational environment. The computer considered
i-c
 the SIFT (Software-Implemented Fault-Tolerance) computer
being developed for the NASA Langley Research Center by SRI
International [8], [9]. Its environment is taken to be the
control of an advanced (next-generation) commercial aircraft
during a transoceanic flight, where such control includes
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"active" controls (e.g., active flutter control) and automatic
landing control, as well as other, more conventional aircraft
control functions. Assumptions regarding the computational
requirements of this environment are based on the study made
by Ratner, et al. (10].
The choice of a fault-tolerant aircraft computer for this
evaluation exercise reflects the principal interest of the
NASA Langley Research Center in their support of this research.
Between the two fault-tolerant architectures being developed
for Langley (SIFT and the Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor [11],
[12] developed by the C. S. Draper Laboratory), the choice
of SIFT was due mainly to the availability of information
regarding the allocation of tasks to processor-memory units [9].
These task allocations, paricularly in degraded modes of operation,
indicate how the structure of SIFT relates to the accomplishment
of aircraft functional tasks. Moreover, the attributes used to
distinguish the "criticalities" of functional tasks [10] support
a natural definition of "accomplishment levels" for the total
system.
In Section II of the paper we give a brief review of the
basic concepts and terminology of performability modeling [1].
Section III describes the construction of a hierarchical model
for the SIFT computer in the computational environment specified
above. The concluding section (Section IV) summarizes the solution
methods used to determine the performability values and presents
numerical results of the evaluation for various choices of
computer and environment parameter values.
•1
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II. PERFORMABILITY MODELING
A computing system, as it operates in its use environment,
may re viewed at several levels. At a low level, there is a
detailed view of how various components of the computer's
hardware and software structure behave throughout the utilization
period. At this level, there is also a detailed view of the
Lehavior of the computer's "environment" where by this term
we mean both demands (workload) imposed by users and peripheral
systems, and natural conditions (e.g., weather, radiation, etc.)
which can influence the system's performability. 	 The computer,
together with its environment, is referred to as the total
system. A second (and usually much less detailed) view of the
total system is the user's view of system behavior, that is,
what the system accomplishes for the user during the utilization
period. A third view (which may coincide with the second) is
the economic benefit derived from using the system, that is,
the computing system's "worth" (as measured, say, in dollars)
when operated in its use environment. Performability evaluation
is concerned with quantifying a system's ability to perform
when it is viewed at the user interface (the second view) and
hence questions of economic benefit may be avoided if desired.
On the other hand, if economic benefit is the primary concern,
performability can be evaluated in these terms by placing the
user interface at this level (i.e., by identifying the second
and third views).
To formally represent these views, let S = (C,E) denote
the total system T 'iere C is the computer and E is its environment.
1
1
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(Although C is referred to as the "computer," it should be
generally interpreted as that part of the total system which
is the object of the evaluation, that is, the part which lies
within the "system boundary"; see [2], [3], for example.)
As is typically done in probabilistic modeling, the low level
view of S is modeled as a stochastic process X S defined over a
time period T called the utilization period. The process XS
is referred to as the base model of S. Each random variable X 
(teT) of the base model X S takes on values in a state space Q,
where a given state in Q represents a particular status of both
the ^omputer and its environment. More precisely, Q = QCXQE
where QC
 is the state space of the computer and QE is the state
space of its environment. Moreover, a state gcQ C may describe
both the structural configuration of the computer and the internal
state of that structure. An instance of the base model's behavior
is a state trajectory u:T -►
 Q where u(t) = X t , the state of S
at time t. Finally, the collection of all possible state trajec-
tories is denoted U and is referred to as the trajectory space
of S. (For a more detailed and more precise development of these
concepts, the reader should refer to [1].)
Regarding the second, user-oriented view of the total system,
we assume that the user is interested in distinguishing a number
of different levels of accomplishment when judging how well
the system has performed throughout the utilization period T
(one such level may be total system failure). The user's
"description space" is thus identified with an accomplishment
set A whose elements are referred to alternatively as accomplishment
,.
1E,
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levels or (user-visible) performance levels. Accordingly, the
user's view of total system behavior is modeled by a random
variable YS taking values in the accomplishment set A. Y S is
referred to as the performance of S. In the terminology of
computer performance evaluation, YS can be regarded as any
user-oriented performance "measure" or "index" that summarizes
the behavior of S throughout the utilization period T. Thus,
"average response time" (averaged over T) could be regarded
as a performance variable YS whereas "response time" would not.
Given this representation of user-visible performance, a
natural measure which quantifies the "ability to perform" is
the probability distribution function of the performance variable
YS . In case the accomplishment set A is discrete (which is the
only case we have considered in the context of aircraft computer
evaluation) the probability (mass) function of YS suffices,
that is, the performability of S is the function p S :A -[0,11
where
PS (a) = the probability that S	 (1)
performs at level a.
In cons''Cructing a model that can support an evaluation of
performability, we assume that enough is known about the proba-
bilistic nature of the computer's structure and environment to
permit the specification of the base model, i.e., the stochastic
process X S . At the outset, on the other hand, little if anything
is known about the performance variable Y S , except that it takes
on values in a designated accomplishment set A. Thus, to determine
j
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the probabilistic nature of YS
 (and hence the performability pS),
we must establish how state trajectories of the base model XS
relate to the accomplishment levels of the performance variable
YS . We refer to this relationship as the capability funct ion
of S which, in terms of the notation introduced above, is
defined as a function y S .from the trajectory space U into the
accomplishment set A. If u(U then y S (u) is interpreted as the
level of accomplishment (performance) that results when the
state trajectory is u. (For a more detailed discussion of
capability functions and their properties, see references
[1) and [13] . )
Once the base model X S
 is specified, the essential problem
in performability modeling is to formulate the capability
function y  or, more precisely, its inverse yS l . The tech-
nique we have used to solve this problem is to elaborate the
base model into a model hierarchv, vermittinc a decomposition_
of 
Y  
into inte revel translations [1]. Once the capability
function is formulated, model solution is basically a two-
step procedure:
(1) For each accomplishment level a in A,
determine the set of all state trajectories
that result in a, tha^ is, determine the
inverse image U  = y  (a).
(2) Using the base model X S , for each a in A,
compute the probability of the trajectory
set U (which is equal to the performability
value pS (a)) .
Although the above review of performability modeling is
tewhat brief, it will hopefully serve as an adequate guide
-9-
for the discussion that follows. Moreover, these various
concepts should acquire more meaning once they are illustrated
in the context of a specific application.
III. MODELING OF SIFT AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
The concepts, models and methods described above appear
to be applicable to a variety of systems (both man-made and
natural) wherein performance may degrade with changes in the
system's structure and environment. The primary motivation
for this development, however, has been to evaluate the
performability of aircraft computing systems of the type
envisioned for next-generation commercial aircraft. Within
this context, the sections that follow describe a relatively
comprehensive performability modeling and evaluation exercise.
In the terminology of the previous section and for
reasons discussed in the introduction, the system considered
is the total system S - (C,E) where C is the SIFT computer
[81,[91 and E is a transoceanic flight of an advanced commercial
aircraft. Assuming that the user is the airline that owns the
aircraft, the user's view of desired total system performance
can be stated quite simply: "Transport passengers from air-
port A to a transoceanic airport B, safely, directly, and with
minimum operational and economic penalties." Examining this
statement in more detail, total system performance can be
described in terms of four attributes: safety, no change in
mission profile, no operational penalties, and no economic
penalties. (See [10] for a more precise interpretation of these
r
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attributes, used there to distinguish the "criticalities"
of various aircraft functional tasks.)
To determine the accomplishment set A for the performance
variable YS we assume that safety is the most important attri-
bute, i.e., safe flights have the greatest worth, the remaining
attributes being worth successively less in the order they
are listed. (These assumptions regarding relative worths
conform with the "reliability requiremer.t:3" specified in [10)
for the corresponding criticality levels.) Assumirq further
that safety is worth considerably more than no change in mission
profile, which in turn is worth considerably more than no
operational penalties, etc., the following accomplishment set
suffices to describe the performance levels of interest to the
user:
A = {a0,al,a2'a3'a41
where
a0
	no economic penalties, no operational penalties,
no change in mission profile, and no fatalities
a l
 = economic penalties, no operational penalties, no
change in mission profile, and no fatalities
a 2 = operational penalties, no chance in mission profile
and no fatalities
a 3
 = change 'n mi_sion profile, and no fatalities
a 4
 = fatalities.
Accordingly, the performance of S !see Section II) is a
random variable Y S
 taking values in the accomplishment set
A specified above. The performabitity p s , which we seek to
evaluate, is the probability (mass) t,n,7tion of YS.
To construct a rase model X S that can support an evalu-
ation of pS , the state spaces QC of SIFT and QE of its
environment must be refined enough so that each state trajectory
(2)
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u:T 
+ QCXQE
of the process XS (see Section II) results in a uniquely
determined accomplishment level a i(A. In other words, the
trajectory space U must admit to the formulation of a capa-
bility function y S :U + A. On examining the architecture of
the SIFT computer, whose general organization is depicted in
Figure 1, we find that it suffices (with one exception to be
discussed later) tc know the number of processor-memcry
units, and the number of busses which are fault-free. In
--:.er words, a state of gEQc can be expressed as an ordered
rair
q = (i,j)
where i is the number of fault-free processor-memory units
and j is the number of fault-free busses. Regarding the
environment, we find that the weather condition at the des-
tination airport is an influential variable and, under reason-
able assumptions, the only environmental variable that need
be considered. (Other environmental factors,such as the
duration of the utilization period T, are fixed for a specific
total system and .hence are regarded as parameters rather than
variables.) Accordingly, the state space of the environment is
Laken to be the two-clement set QE - {0,1} interpreted as
follows:
1: Zero visibility (Category III) weather at the
destination airport
	 (3)
0: Not 1.
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Regarding the utilization period T, we assume that the
utilization of SIFT is continuous from ramp departure of the
aircraft to ramp arrival at the destination airport. More
precisely, taking the departure time to be t=0, if h is the
duration of utilization (in hours) then T is the closed real
interval
T = [ O , h ] = W O-st`h} .
Accordingly, the base model is a stochastic process
XS
 = {XtltE[O,h]}
where each random variable X  takes values in the state space
QC x QE. If further, we let XC t and XE t denote the projections
of X  on QC and QE , respectively, it is reasonable to assume
that the processes
x  = {XC,tltE[O,h]}	 (4)
and
x  = {XE,t(tE[O,h]}
	 (5)
are (statistically) independent. (What we are saying here
is that the number of fault-free resources in SIFT is inde-
pendent of the weather condition at the destination airport.
This should not be confused with how the use of SIFT's resources
depends on the weather; the latter type of dependence is
"functional" [13] and is determined by the nature of the
capability function y S .) Thus the base model XS is determined
once we specify the probabilistic nature of the stochastic
processes X  and XE . It is convenient, however to defer
these details to the subsequent discussion of a hierarchical
model of S.
In general, to facilitate the description of the capability
function, we have proposed the use of a model hierarchy (see
f
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111) which, proceeding from the top down (the "top" model
is closely related to the performance variable Y S ), consists
of a sequence of models describing the total system in sucessively
more detail. The "bottom" model of the hierarchy is comprised
of those components of the base model which cannot be introduced
directly at higher levels.
For the system in question, we fi. ,. it convenient to intro-
duce three levels of detail (abstraction) and refer to them,
respectively as the "mission level" (level 0), the "aircraft
level" (level 1), and the "computer level" (level 2). Following
the terminology and notation of (1], the model at level i
(0<:::) is a stochastic process X i defined in terms of
a composite process 
x  
and basic process Xb. (The composite
process inherits its behavior from the level i+l model; the
basic process does not, i.e., it is a component of the base
model process XS .) The trajectory spaces of Xc an d Xb are
denoted U^ and Ub, respectively, and trajectories in Uc ® Ub
determine trajectories in Uc-1 (i>1) via an interlevel trans-
lation K i . (When i=0, K 0 is a function from level 0 trajectories
into the accomplishment set A.)
This notation is summarized in Figure 2 which depicts
the model hierarchy for S and its relation to the performance
variable YS . (It is helpful to compare Figure 2 with Figure
lb in [11, where the latter depicts the general form of a
model hierarchy.) The specific nature of the hierarchy in
question is dea:tP%rd in the subsections that follow.
-14-
Mission Level (Level 0)
The model at this level, which is the "top" of the model
hierarchy, is close to the accomplishment set A and simply
formalizes the attributes used earlier to distinguish accomplish-
ment levels. More precisely, we take the level 0 state
space to be the set
Q0 = {0,1}4
where the four coordinates are referred to as ECONOMICS, OPERATIONS,
PROFILE and SAFETY, respectively. A coordinate value of 0
denotes the presence of the corresponding attribute; 1 denotes
its absence. Thus, for example, the state
q = (1,0,1,0)
says that the flight incurred economic penalties, no operational
penalties, a change in mission profile, and was safe. More-
over, we assume that all the coordinates are "composite,"
that is their values will be uniquely determined by a state
trajectory of the level 1 model. Hence Q 0 = Q0 and accordingly
(by definition) all the state trajectories of the level
0 model will be composite. (This explains the lack of a
basic trajectory space Ub0 in Figure 2.) Moreover, since
we are modeling the outcome of the mission after utilization
is completed (i.e., at time t = h) the level 0 model is a
single-variable random process
X 0 = { Xh}
with a trajectory space that coincides with the state space, i.e.,
U0
 = U0 = Q0 = {0,1}4
(Note that the term "trajectory" is somewhat misleading in this
,+
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instance; however, we prefer to maintain a common vocabulary
that applies to any level of the hierarchy.) Given the inter-
pretation of Q0 (and hence U 0 ) specified above, the translation
K0 : U0 4 A is determined immediately from the definitions
of the accomplishment levels (see (2)). The function
table of K0 is shown in Table 1 where * denotes that the
variable value can be either 0 or 1.
Aircraft Level (Level 1)
The model at this level of the hierarchy describes the
extent to which various aircraft functional tasks can be accom-
plished during various phases of the flight. The environment
part of the base model (i.e., the weather condition at the
destination airport) is also introduced at this level. The
latter is possible since task allocation priorities in the SIFT
computer (see [121) are weather independent. Note, however,
this does rule out "use" dependencies of the type referred to
earlier, e.g., computations required for an automatic landing
are not used during clear weather. Such dependencies are
captured by the translation of level 1 trajectories into
level 0 trajectories, which will be discussed momentarily.
The aircraft functional tasks considered are a repre-
sentative subset of those identified in (10) and subsequently
added to and modified in [9). More specifically, we make
the following assumptions regarding the aircraft, where
the functional tasks considered (a total of 8) are signified
by capital letter names or acronyms.
-16-
a) The aircraft has an Aircraft Integrated Data System
(AIDS) which continuously executes in-flight analyses
of various on-board data. This information is econom-
cally useful to the airline for assessing aircraft
performance and for scheduling maintenance. Hence,
"loss" of AIDS is assumed to result in economic penalties.
(By the "loss" of a functional task we mean the inability
to accomplish that task.)
b) The aircraft has two means of navigation. The first
involves an inertial guidance system (INERTIAL), while
the second means involves an air data system (AIR DATA)
along with two radio beacon systems: Very-High Frequency
Omnirange (VOR) and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME).
(Support of VOR and DME is regarded as a single functional
task denoted VOR/DME.) We assume that the signals
generated by the VOR/DME system will not be receivable
by aircraft more than 250 nautical miles from a transmit-
ting station, and in particular, more than 250 nautical
miles from land. The AIR DATA task is required to support
the VOR/DME task.
c) If INERTIAL is lost before the aircraft enters
a region where it cannot receive VOR/DME signals (especially
an oceanic region on a transoceanic mission), it will
return to its origin. We make the simplifying assumption
that if the aircraft must make such a diversion, it
returns safely to its origin with no further incidents.
Such a diversion is considered a change in mission profile.
d) If INERTIAL is lost while the aircraft is out of
range of the VOR/DME system, the aircraft loses its
navigational capability. Likewise, loss of INERTIAL
along with VOR/DME or AIR DATA results in a loss of
navigational capability. These losses are assumed to
result in a change in mission profile.
e) Loss of VOR/DME or AIR DATA tasks results in eco-
nomic penalties.
f) The aircraft has an autoland system (AUTOLAND) which,
if operational, will land the plane in any weather. The
AUTOLAND system requires the results of INERTIAL compu-
tations as well as AUTOLAND computations. If, just prior
to initiation of landing, the destination airport has
Category III weather and the aircraft does not have
AUTOLAND capability then a diversion is made to another
airport. Such a diversion is considered a change in
mission profile.
,e
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g) If, just prior to the initiation of landing, the desti-
nation airport has Category III weather and the aircraft
has the AUTOLAND capability, AUTOLAND is used. Loss of
AUTOLAND during such a landing will cause the plane to
crash, resulting in an unsafe mission.
h) The aircraft has active flutter control (ACTIVE
FLUTTER CONTROL), attitude control (ATTITUDE CONTROL),
and engine control (ENGINE CONTROL) functions, all of
which are critical to the airworthiness of the plane.
Loss of any of these functions results in an unsafe
misssion.
Given the above assumptions regarding the aircraft, we
find that computer behavior, when viewed at the aircraft level,
can be represented as SIFT's ability to accomplish (via
execution of required computational tasks) each of eight
aircraft functional tasks:
Task
1 : A?OS
2 : AIR DATA
3 : VOR/DME
4 : INERTIAL
5 : AUTOLAND
6 : ACTIVE FLUTTER CONTROL
7 : ENGINE CONTROL
8 : ATTITUDE CONTROL
during each of four phases of the utilization period:
Phase
1 : Takeoff/cruise until VOR/DYz out of range
2 : Cruise until VOR/DME in range again
3 : Cruise until landing is to be initiated
4 : Landing.
Accordingly, the trajectory space U
c
 of the composite process
X
c can be conveniently represented by the set of all 8x4 matrices
1{i58
u = Iqi, j ]	 ( lf-j`4)
where, except for coordinates (5,1) and (5,2),
0 if task i can be accomplished
_	 throughout phase j
qi, j
	
	 (6)
1 otherwise.
/ ^ l
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In the case of coordinates ( 5,l) and (5,2), since we know
that task 5 (AUTOLAND) need not be accomplished during phases
1 and 2, q5,1 and q5,2 are assigned a constant value "id".
During phase 3, the AUTOLAND task is interpreted as the
checkout of the autoland system (prior to its possible use
during landing).
To permit level 1 trajectories to be translated into level
0 trajectories (i.e., to determine the interlevel translation
K 1 ), the level 1 model must also convey the weather condition
at the destination airport just prior to the initiation of
the landing phase (see assumptions f) and g)). Accordingly,
the basic part of the level 1 model is taken to be the
environment model X  (see (5)) when sampled at the end of
phase 3. More precisely, if phase 3 ends at time t 3 then
the basic part is the (degenerate) process.
1 __
Xb	 {XE,t3} .
Extending the time base of Xb1 to that of X I , the combined
trajectory space U1 = Ulou11 can be represented by the set of
all 9x4 matrices
(1!ij r-4)
1Ki.59
where the first 8 rows represent trajectories in U 1 (as speci-
fied above), g93 (QE ( see (3)), and q9 , 1 = q9,2	 q9,4
Given this representation of level 1 state trajectories
and under assumptions a)-h) stated above, the interlevel
translation K1:U1 - ►
 U0 can then be specified. In general,
however, when specifying an interlevel translation K i , we
,/
er
r1^r
seek to avoid a complete tabulation of the values Ki(u)
for each trajectory u(U i since, as we move down a model
hierarchy, the size of the trajectory sets U  can become
unmanageabley large. (Note that, even in the case of th--
small space U  = {0,1} 4 , we avoided complete tabulation
through use of the symbol "*".) In response to this need,
we have developed a general method (see (141-(151) for spec-
ifying the K i in a form that is feasible for large trajectory
spaces and is suited to solution methods for computing per-
formability.
Although space does not permit a detailed description
of this specification method, its application to the interlevel
translation K1
 can be summarized as follows. K 1
 is first
decomposed into its projections onto the individual coordinates
of UO
 = {0,1} 4 , i.e., into the functions i K1 W1 i,4) where,
if uEUO , ^ i (u) is the value of the ith coordinate of u.	 iK1
denotes the composition of functions K 1 and E i , first applying
K 1 •) Each function & i K 1 is then specified by specifying the
inverse image (^iK1) -1(v) for each value v(C i (U0 ) = {0,1}.
However, instead of tabulating all the trajectories in this
preimage (which is a subset of U 1 ), it is expressed as a
disjoint union of "Cartesian" subsets of Ul.
(Since trajectories in U l
 are represented by matrices (6), a
Cartesian subset V of U l
 can be regarded as a 9 X 4 matrix
whose entries are the component sets of the Cartesian product
V.) This representation thus parallels the use of "subcubes"
to represent switching functions (see (16], for example)
although, in general, we allow the coordinate values to be
1
A{	
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elements of an arbitrary finite set (the state set of the level
i model) .
To illustrate part of the specification of K 1 , suppose
i=3 (the PROFILE coordinate of U0 ) and v-0 (no change in mission
profile).	 Then the corresponding set of level 1 trajectories
is the union of three Cartesian subsets of U1 , that is,
* * * * * * * * * * * * AIDS
* * * * * * 0 ' * * * * * VOR/DME
* * * * * * 0 * * * * * AIR DATA
()0
( 3 K 1 ) -1
0
0
0*
*
0
U
0
*
1*
*
0
U
0 0*
1 *
INERTIAL
AUTOLAND(0)	 _	 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
* * * * * * * * * * * * ACTIVE FLUTTER CONTROL
* * * * * * * * * * * * ENGINE CONTROL
* * * * * * * * * * * * ATTITUDE CONTROL
¢ ¢ * ¢ ¢ ¢ 0 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0 ¢ WEATHER
where 0, 1, ¢ and * denote the sets {0}, {1}, {¢} and {0,1},
respectively. The complete specification of K l , along with a
more detailed discussion of its derivation, can be found in [15].
Computer Level (Level 2)
The model Xb at the bottom of the hierarchy is the
computer component of the base model process X S , i.e., the
stochastic process X  identified earlier in the discussion
(see (4)). In determining the specific nature of XC , many
of the issues to be resolved are similar to those encountered
in reliability modeling (see [ 5 ] - [ 7 ] , for example) and,
in particular, those addressed by SRI in their investigation of
reliability models for SIFT (see [9], Section VII). Since
the emphasis here is on needs that are peculiar to performabil-
ity modeling, our construction of X  is based on a relatively
idealized Markov model of SIFT (referred to in [9] as "Model I")
where faults are assumed to be permanent and reconfiguration
times are assumed to be instantaneous. On the other hand, to
.,
r"^	 r
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deal with performance issues such as the effect of different
computational demands (workloads) during different phases of
the flight, the utilization period T is decomposed into eight
phases at level 2 ( see Table 2). Within a given phase, we
take the process X  to be a time-homogeneous Markov process
similar to SRI's Model I. However, we generally permit these
intraphase processes to differ from phase to phase, where the
probabilities of interphase state transitions (which take place
at the time of a phase change) are specified by interphase
transition matrices ( see (14], ( 151). Assuming a maximum of
n processors (i.e., processor -memory units) and m busses, the
intraphase Markov process assumed for all phases except the
takeoff phases is given by the transition graph of Figure 3. For
the takeoff phase, state pairs (2,j) and (2 1 ,j) are identified
for all j, in which case the model reduces to ERI's Model I
((91,p. 151, Figure VII-2). The need for the states (2',j)
during phases 2-8 is to distinguish whether a particular pro-
cessor is reduced from 3 to 2. (The fact that processors do
not look alike when only three remain fault-free is a consequence
of task allocation constraints which will be discussed momentarily.
Given the computer level model Xb = X C , it remains to
specify how trajectories in U b (variations in the structure
of SIFT) translate via K 2 into trajectories in U  (varia-
tions in SIFT's ability to accomplish aircraft functional
tasks). Such a specification is based primarily on hew
functional tasks or, more precisely, the computational tasks
-22-
that support them, are allocated to a given number of fault-
free processors. Assuming that each processor has a capacity
of 0.16 MIPS (millions of instructions per second) and each
memory has 5 kilowords of storage (these assumptions are scaled
down from those of [91 since we are considering a reduced
number of functional tasks), this allocation is determined by an
algorithm (see[15)) similar to the one employed in [9). As
a consequence, for each phase of the level 2 model, we are
able to specify which functional tasks are lost (cannot be
accomplished by SIFT) as a function of the number of fault-
free processors. This information is summarized in Table 3.
The information in Table 3, along with the assumption
that communication among any number of processors is insured
as long as at least two busses remain fault-free (see [91),
suffices to determine the interlevel translation K 2 . Because
busses do not play an essential role when at least 2 remain
fault-free, it suffices to specify K 2 for trajectories over the
state space
Q = {1,2,2',3,4,5,6}
where, in terms of the states of the bottom model,
1 = (F}
i = ( ( i , j ) 2 ~- jam}	 if i=2,2',3,4,5
6 = ((i,j) 6-5i<_n,2!-:j<_m}
Accordingly, trajectories over Q are represented by the set of
al'. 1X8 matrices
u = [qk l	 (15k58)
0
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where
q  = i	 if the structural state of SIFT is
in set i ( i(d) at the end of phase k.
(During phase 1, states 2 and 2' are identified since, accord-
ing to Table 3, there is no need to distinguish them.) The
method used to specify K 2 is identical to that used at level
1, except that 32 coordinates must now be accounted for instead
of 4. A full specification of K 2 , obtained by this method,
is described in (15). Having established all the ingredients
of the hierarchy (Figure 2), our modeling of S is complete.
IV. Solution Methods and Results
As outlined in the concluding paragraph of Section II,
once a performability model has been constructed for a system S,
the computation of its performability p  (see (1), Section II)
is basically a two-step procedure. The first step relies
on a knowledge of the capability function YS and, for each
accomplishment level a(A, yields an appropriate representation
of all the base model state trajectories that result in a,
i.e., all trajectories in the set U  = 'Y S 1 (a). The second
step relies on a knowledge of the probabilitic nature of the
base model XS and, for each trajectory set U a , yields the
performability value pS(a).
The problems encountered in carrying out these steps
are both interesting and challenging since, in effect, they are
generalized versions of problems currently being dealt with in
the more specific contexts of performance evaluation and relia-
bility evaluation. Our work to date concerning each of these
r-24-
steps has been carried to the point where models of moderate
complexity,such as the one just described in the previous
section, can be solved without an undue amount of effort.
Certain of the algorithms used, particularly in the second
step, have been implemented by programt that reside in a
prototype software package called METAPHOR (Michigan Evaluation
Aid for Perphormability). Other algorithms, which have not
yet been programmed, can fortunately be carried out manually,
although the effort required is somewhat tedious and laborious.
Since space does not permit discussion of these methods,
we can only outline the underlying ideas and point, as we
did in Section III, to some recent technical reports for further
information. Regarding the first step, i.e., the determination
of the trajectory sets U a , the algorithm used here is based
on the fact that y s l can formulated in terms of the inverses
of the interlevel translations K i . Thus, for the hierarchy
in question (Figure 2), y- l (a) is computed by first determining
r. 0}a), and then applying K1 1 followed by K Z I . An important
feature of this algorithm is that it manipulates Cartesian
representations of the type illustrated in Section III (see
(7)). Moreover, the trajectory sets determined at each level
of the hierarchy are always expressed as disjoint unions of
Cartesian subsets. Details concerning the derivation and
application of this algorithm can be found in (15].
The second step of the solution procedure computes the
probability of each base model trajectory set Ua . The algorithm
requires that Ua be expressed as a disjoint union of Cartesian
I-25-
components, but this is automatically provided by the output
of step 1. The probability of each Cartesian component
is then computed using a specially developed algorithm that
involves the "intraphase" and "interphase" transition matrices
of the base model (14). Summing the probabilities of these
components yields the performablity value pS (a) and, when
this is done for each level a, the computation of pS terminates.
Applying these algorithms, the performability of SIFT
was evaluated for a number of specific instances of the total
system model described in Section III. An instance of the
model is obtained by fixing the values of the following
computer and environment parameters:
COMPUTER (SIFT)
Cl) Hardware resources, that is, the number of pi :ussors
n and the number of busses m (see Figures 1 a_3 3).
C2) Hardware failure rates, that is, the pre-cessor failure
rate p, and the bus failure rate q (sea Figure 3).
C3) Initial state distribution, that is, the probability
distribution of the random variable 
xC,0 (sea. (2)).
ENVIORNMENT
E1) Flight duration h and phase durations.
E2) Probability of Category III weather at destination
airport.
Evaluations were based on the following selection of
parameter values:
Cl) n-6 and m-5.
C2) As in (91, we assume that p = 10_
4
 and	 10-5
(failures per hour).
ie
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C3) Two types of initial state distributions are considered.
The first type is "deterministic" in the sense that
one computer state has probability 1 of being the init-
ial state (the remaining states having probability 0).
If (i,j) is the state having probability 1, this
dittribution is denoted
Det(i,j).
The second type of initial state distribution considered
is truly probabilistic where one of two specific distri-
butions are assumed. These are denoted I 1 and I 2 and
are given in Table 4.
E1) Two plight missions are considered, a 6 hour and 25
minute flight from London to New York (JFK Airport)
and a 10 hour flight from Tel Aviv to New York. The
assumed phase durations associated with each flight
are given in Table 5.
E2) The probability of Category III weather at JFK is taken
to be 0.011 (see [171, p. 173).
For-the fixed values of Cl, C2, and EL indicated above
and for choices C3 and E1 as indicated in Tables 4 and 5,
14 specific systems were evaluated (denoted S1' S 2' ''S14).
For each system S i the results of the performability evaluation
are tabulated in Table 6, where the entry corresponding to
system Si
 and accomplishment lei,l a  is the probability p S
 (aj).
i
On examining Table 6, we see that a performability eval-
uation provides the t.ser with a "spECtrum" of numbers which
quantifies degradable performance when viewed at the user
interface. Although the user's primary concern, in this
case, is safety, if the probability p S (a4) of an unsafe
flight is acceptably low, the performability at safe levels
(levels a 0-a 3 ) is also a legitimate concern of the u-er.
Moreover, we believe that the design of an aircraft computer
should reflect this concern, that is, performability .should
be accounted for by design algorithms (e.g., the allocation
and scheduAng of computational tasks) and should be evaluated
-27-
in the process of assessing design alternatives.
Although the results given by Table 6 are interesting
F
in themselves, we will resist the temptation to interpret this
data since our intent here is not to critique the design of
the SIFT computer. Instead, the purpose of this study has been
to demonstrate the feasibility of pei -:rmability modeling and
evaluation and to illustrate the type of results that can be
obtained. We believe that this has been accomplished and,
moreover, we hope that the preceding discussion has helped
to clarify the kind of modeling concepts and solution techniques
needed to evaluate the performability of degradable computing
r
	 systems.
L}
Figure 1
Hardware organization of SIFT
Mi : memory Pi : processor	 B i : bus
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Key: p - processor failure rate
q - bus failure rate
(n--1-) p ... 4p}
(n-1) p	 4p
(m-1) q	 (m-1) q	 (m-1) q
m-1)q
1}E^ ...
Figure 3
Markov transition graph for phases other than takeoff
Atr	?
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K0 02)
ECONOMICS OPERATIONS PROFILE SAFETY
0 0 0 0 a0
1 0 0 0 al
* 1 0 0 a2
* * 1 0 a3
* * * 1 a4
Table 1
Function table of K0
i
a,
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Level 2 Level 1
Phase Description Phase
1 Take-off
2 Climb 1
3 Cruise I
4 Cruise II 2
5 Cruise III
6 Descent 3
7 Approach
8 Landing 4
Y
-I
.	 ,
Table 2
Level 2 phases ani
their relation to
level 1
T_	 •
^	 F
.h
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Phase
so. of
Processors	 1	 2- 6	 7	 8
n - - - -
6 - - - -
5 - AIDS
INERTIAL
4 INERTIAL AIDS AIDS
AIDS
INERTIAL AIR DATA
3 INERTIAL AIDS
AIDS AIDS
INERTIAL
2 INERTIAL AIDS
AIDS
INERTIAL
ENGINE CONTROL ENGINE CONTROL ENGINE CONTROL
2' INERTIAL INERTIAL INERTIAL
AIDS AIDS AIDS
1 All Tasks All Tasks All Tasks All Tasks
Table 3
Loss of functional tasks
A
.,34,..
state Distribution
(i.j) 11 I2
(6,6) .64 .31
(6,5) .128 .081
(6,4) .032 .009
(5,6) .16 .09
(5,5) .032 .009
(5,4) .008 .001
Others 0 0
Table 4
Initial state probabilities
Flight
Phase London-New York Tel Aviv-New York
Takeoff 1 minute 1 minute
Climb 15 minutes 15 minutes
Cruise I 25 minutes 25 minutes
Cruise II 5 hours 8 hours 35 minutes
Cruise III 25 minutes 25 minutes
Descent 15 minutes 15 minutes
Approach 3 minutes 3 minutes
Landing 1 minute 1 minute
Total 6 hours 25 minutes 10 hours
Duration
Table 5
Phase durations
1
r	 Ge
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System
C3
nit. State
H stribut b^
21
flight
Accaispliehment Level
S 1 Dft(6,6) Lon-NY 3.80x10 3 3.78x10-12 6.02 x10 6 1.95r10-12
S2 Det(6,5) Lon-NY
r96
3.80x10 3 3.79x10 
12 6.02 x10
-6
1.95x10-12
S3 Det(6,4) Lon-NY 3.80x10 3 1.32x10 10 6.05x10 6 2.97x10-12
S4 Det(5,6) Lon-NY 0 9.97x10-1 1.03x10 9 3.17x10-3 1.55x10-9
S 5 Det(5,5) Lon-NY 0 9.97x10-1 1.03 x 10-9 3.17x10 3 1.55.1r,_9
S6 Det(5,4) Lon-NY 9.97x10 1 1.16x10-9 3.17x10 3 1.55x10-9
S7 Det(6,6) TA-NY 0 1 6.03x10-3 6.07,10- 12 1.52x10 5 1.30x10-11
S8 Det(6,5) TA-NY 0 1 6.03x10
-3
6.12x10-12 1.52x10-5 1.30x10-11
S9 Det(6,4) TA-NY 0 i
rO
6.03x10 3 2.09x10 1u 1.53x10-5 1.71x10-11
S 10 Det(5,6) TA-NY 9.95x101 1.03x10-9 5.03x10
-3
7.15x10-9
S 11 Det(5,S) TA-NY 9.95x10-1 1.03x10-9 5.03x10-3 7.15x:0-9
S 12 Det(5,4) TA-NY 0 9.95x10 1 1.23x10
-9
5.03x10-3 7.15x10-9
5 13 I1 TA-NY 7.95x10-1 2.04x10-1 2.18x10-10 1.02x10
-3
1.4440 -9
S10 I2 TA-NY 8.95x10-1 1.05x10
-1 1.10x10 10 5.17x10
-4
7.26x10-1u
Table 6
Performability results
of"FE IS
4
l 	 ^^
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